The questions for me are these. Was the BM5 back on patrol station when the incident happened? Was the fact that that the ship was hijacked while it was carrying containers and bound for Kenya from Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates, reportedly 900 nautical miles away from the Somalian border makes her operations impractical to join the Malaysian convoys transiting the area. The expansion of Somalian piracy theater of operations was a fact that I mentioned in my previous posting, and the question of the need to have another escort vessel in station while the other goes home should now become central. This does not include the quandary whether a single escort vessel is actually sufficient to meet Malaysian vessels escort needs in the expanded threat area.
Such operational realities now needs to be answered, and whether the responsibility should remain only with MISC and the Navy or should also now be shared by all Malaysian shipping operators operating in the threat area. Even if the BM5 is still at home port while the incident transpired, it would be unreasonable to put any blame either on the Navy, MISC or the Malaysian Government. Their best efforts will never be good enough to protect all the Malaysian ships in the area, even more so with such limited resources. Those who complain should sign up and go for the 100 plus days tour themselves, or just shut their mouths up!